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This article contrasts and compares the war on
terror and the war of terror in the wake of, and before,
11 September 2001. The philosophical underpinnings
involved in defining "terrorism" are analyzed in the
context of the United States' war on terrorism and
related wars of terrorism, such as the 1998 World Islamic
Council's fatwa. Both wars fall within the wording of
recent United Nations' Resolutions that address the
adverse impact of terrorism on Human Rights. The
understanding of the meaning of "terrorism" by those
promoting the war on terrorism provides a powerful
political tool, notwithstanding effects on Human Rights
that are similar to the effects that result from the war of
terrorism. These two wars signify a patterned break from
the classical comity between nation-states with respect to
acts of aggression, and the values being promoted in this
context serve the emerging American Empire and the
resistance to it. The result, framed by those promoting
the war on terrorism, is that-either being for or against
terrorism-potential for non-violent solutions are
lessened. Since September 11, the war on terror has
installed a new rule of preemptive self-defence,
grounded in suspicion, and with no recent precedent in
international law.
Cet article met en contraste et compare la guerre
contre le terrorisme et la guerre du terrorisme A la suite
du 11 septembre et avant. Les fondements
philosophiques qu'implique la d6finition du . terrorisme
- sont analys6s dans le contexte de la guerre am6ricaine
contre le terrorisme, puis reli6s aux guerres du
terrorisme, comme la fatwa du Conseil du monde
islamique de 1998. Les deux guerres s'inscrivent dans la
d6finition des r6centes r6solutions de 'ONU, lesquelles
traitent de l'effet nuisible que le terrorisme exerce sur les
droits de la personne. Comprendre la signification du .
terrorisme , permettra a ceux qui pr~conisent la guerre
contre le terrorisme de disposer d'un outil politique
puissant, mme si les effets sur les droits de la personne
sont semblables aux effets d6coulant de la guerre du
terrorisme. Ces deux guerres d6notent reffondrement
m6thodique de la communion classique entre Etats
nations en matilre d'actes d'agression. Les valeurs
6rig6es dans cc contexte servent rEmpire Americain
naissant et la r6sistance A son encontre. Le rdsultat,
formul6 par ceux qui mettent en avant la guerre contre
le terrorisme, est que - dtant soit pour, soit contre le
terrorisme - la possibilit6 de solutions non-violentes est
amoindrie. Depuis le 11 septembre, la guerre contre le
terrorisme a instaur6 une nouvelle rlgle d'autod6fense
preventive, fond6e sur le soupgon, rlgle sans aucun
pr6cdent r6cent dans le droit international.
2005, U. Baxi.
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The onset of the twenty first century is marked by an inaugural era
of the "war on terror" and "war of terror." The "war on terror" has already
assumed fierce form as a term of art; for that and related reasons, I here
innovate its other, namely the "war of terror." The "war on terror" makes
sense only within the contexts provided by the "war of terror." In itself,
neither "war" nor "terror" constitutes any new phenomenon. This
conjunction, the doubling, the now endless mirror imaging, this rather
voracious doublementfunctionale remains violently inaugural; never before
September 11, 2001 ("9/11"), were acts of "terror" described in terms of a
"war," nor were the practices of counter-"terror."'
I here use the expression "war of terror" to signify both the
collective intent and capability of non-state actors and networks to deliver,
organize, and implement the threat or use of force directed preeminently
against civilian populace and sites across the world. The intent consists in
declaring "war" and waging international hostilities against sovereign
incumbents in the world order; the capability consists in harnessing some
extraordinary material resources (such as money and armament) and non-
material resources (such as professional competence and skills in the
preparation for, and organization of, "efficient" recourse to violence,
Because the categories "terror," "terrorism," and the "wars" on and of "terror" remain shot
through with constitutive ambiguities, they ought to be always placed within quotation marks. I
apologize to the editors and readers for this stylistic inelegance. Any essentialist (or reductionist)
understanding stands at the outset forbidden by long, even ancient, histories. See e.g. Walter Laqueur,
Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977) [Laqueur, Terrorism].
Remarks on Two "Wars"
cultivating motivation for its self-annihilating practices, and overall
commitment to a professed just cause). While the ensemble of violent
capabilities remains cruelly on display in each act of this "war," the intent
remains difficult to decipher because the agents and mangers of this "war"
do not form territorially based coherent groups or collectivities, and
because their "practical reason" remains diversely articulated in ways that
resist acts of ideological reading.2
The kindred expression "war on terror" remains co-equally
intelligible only in terms of some anticipated/posited/already
posted/imagined futures of human history. Enactments of the "war on
terror" stand super-justified in terms of the protection and promotion of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the international or global rule
of law, and, most comprehensively, as a worldwide installation of market-
friendly democracy and freedom. Shortly put, this war on terror remains by
definition a "just war," raising the question only of how far the
nomenclature may retard its efficient pursuit.3 An ideological peculiarity of
this war is that it instantly de-focuses antecedent or ongoing forms of state
and international "terrorism."4
This war mobilizes an infinite potential for counter-terror response
by the coalitions of willing states against nomadic insurgents and states that
supposedly or allegedly harbour them. In this "war" the latter forfeit their
status as co-equal sovereign formations instantly upon the fabrication of
their status as "rogue," "outlaw," or "failed" states, which, by acts of
omission and commission, are labeled as complicit with the "war of terror."
Their consent as co-equal sovereign states (as hitherto understood in
international law discourse) remains irrelevant to acts of "war on terror,"
in hot pursuit of "terrorists" within otherwise secure territorial boundaries.
This war, being conducted recently in the name of the coalitions of the
willing states, claims to serve the spirit of the UN Charter, even when
2 Many analyses of the "war" rightly conclude that it is misleading to see in it any inherently
simple-minded Huntington-type "clash of civilizations" ideology. By the same token, it is not always
understandable in terms of resistance to neoliberalism and globalization. See e.g. George Leaman,
"Iraq, American Empire, and the War on Terrorism" (2004) 35 Metaphilosophy 234. Ulrich Beck
maintains that the "outbreak of global terror amounts to a Chernobyl of globalization." See Ulrich
Beck, "The Silence of Words: On Terror and War" (2003) 34 Security Dialogue 255 at 262. This
metaphor remains both heavily epidemiological and accidental. In contrast, Charles Tilly insightfully
urges cautious grounded understanding in his article, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists" (2004) 22
Sociological Theory 5.
3 Thus, for example, Giles Andr6ani rather gallantly provides six reasons for moderating the
languages of "war on terror." See Giles Andr6ani, "The 'War on Terror': Good Cause, Wrong Concept"
(2004) 46 Survival 31.
See Noam Chomsky, "Who Are the Global Terrorists?" in Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, eds.,
Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 128.
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fulsomely acting its letter. By definition, the accompanying justificatory
regimes of "preemptive war" and "regime change" stand directed against
the nations and peoples of the Third World because the Euroamerican or
the triadic state (the United States, the European Union, and Japan)
formations remain, with overwhelming and even manifest dubiousness,
obviously beyond the discourse of "failed states." Thus, the violence of the
inaugural wars on and of terror consists in their globally constituted
character. This article offers some preliminary approaches to the
understanding of these two heavily proclaimed "wars," their impacts on the
future of human rights (as we knew them), and the making/remaking of yet
another fiercely proclaimed and professed "new" international law and
orderings.
I. "TERROR"/"TERRORISM": PHILOSOPHIC
UNDERSTANDINGS AND PRACTICAL TASKS
Although rather sparse, philosophical writing concerning the two
wars has some considerable pertinence to lawyerly and policy tasks. It
remains concerned both with the problem of definitional understanding of
"terror" and "terrorism" and the construction and critique of justifications
for recourse to terror.
The genealogies and chronologies of these two contemporary wars
infinitely complicate understanding of the violent post-9/11 world
disordering. Protagonists of both the wars maintain that theirs is a response
to prior situations or histories of "terrorism." It is not easy, even as a matter
of simple chronology, to say which one comes first. The salient agents of the
"war of terror" offer assorted reasons/justifications for this war as a
response to an underlying war of "terror," even a series of these. They seem
to justify their actions as a response to the recent but still ancient (this
awkward phrasing illustrates the complexity of periodization) wrongs
unleashed by the previous histories of wars of terror. In contrast, the
protagonists of the "war on terror" regard theirs as a "second war," which
may not have happened at all without the first (that is, the "war of terror").
The second war, it is loudly said, occurs because the first severely threatens
the futures of a global capitalist driven new-human, even post-human,
civilization.' The second war has no use for any scrupulous regard for the
causes that underscore the first war. By the common consent of "civilized
nations" (that is, the newly progressive Eurocentric state formation
manifest through the "coalitions of willing states") the existing body of
5Concerning the latter, see Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the
Biotechnology Revolution (London: Profile Books, 2002).
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normative legal restraints concerning the use of force do not, as we see
later, apply; in their place some newly fangled doctrines of "pre-emptive"
war and "regime change" now stand uneasily installed. This second war has
scant regard for its own, otherwise endlessly proclaimed, Euroamerican
"gift" of human rights with respect to the benighted "failed states,"
exemplars of what Gayatri Spivak now troublesomely labels "failed
decolonization."6
How may philosophical thinking or method help clarify the
contending beliefs and performances? To start with, one may describe the
situation as posing the problem of causality in a way that enables some
preliminary means of describing causes and effects. The old Aristotelian
categories of causality may suggest to us the distinction between proximate
cause and efficient or final cause. In that case, one may say that 9/11
constituted the proximate cause of the "war on terror" just as the efficient
cause is provided, for the protagonists of the "war of terror," by the past
histories of "terror." But this language does not altogether avoid a "linear,
deterministic, and nondialectical logic of causality," which assumes causes
as originally given; following a Hegelian dialectical understanding, Angelica
Nuzzo recently concludes that
Terrorism (as well as its symbol, 9/11) is ... the true effect or the real consequence of the war
against terrorism that the United States has been waging for decades in numerous parts of
the world. In other words, war is the true cause of that which it declares it is
fighting-namely, terrorism.'
Put another way, "dialectic shows that terrorism is an effect, not a
cause," with the consequence that "politics aimed at opposing" the war on
terror will "have to look to reasons that lead to the exercise of violence and
will have to fight the effect along with the causes that produce it."' 8 Nuzzo
suggests that a dialectical understanding remains "essential if we want to
reach a nonideologicial and noninstrumental definition of terrorism" and
6 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing
Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). But see Ruth Gordon, "Saving Failed States:
Sometimes a Neocolonial Notion" (1997) 12 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 903. At least, in this regard, the
campaign strategies of George W. Bush and John Kerry present a remarkable verisimilitude. The Kerry
campaign faulted the Bush regime for being inefficient and diversionary in terms of capture and
annihilation of Osama bin Laden and AI-Qaeda "terrorists."
7 "Reasons for Conflict: Political Implications of a Definition of Terrorism" (2004) 35
Metaphilosophy 330 at 336. I do not, for reasons of space, here elaborate the difficult slippage from
"causes" to "reasons" in this analysis; nor may I here seek to unravel the complexity of the phrase "the
war against terrorism that the United States has been waging for decades in numerous parts of the
world."
8 Ibid. at 339.
2005]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 43, NO. 1 & 2
if we want to "regain the historical-and oppose the fictional-sense of the
reality in which we live."9 In this sense, the struggle consists in providing
"definitions" that at least speak to aspects of historical and structural
domination and denial of human rights and justice perpetuated by the
United States as well as the Soviet Union (and their allies) in the twentieth
century, and by the colonial and imperialistic Eurocentric global hegemons
in the three centuries preceding the current waging of the "war on terror."
On the other hand, philosopher Alain Badiou recently offered the
insight that the word "terrorist," and the adjective "terrorism," has "no
neutral readability," precisely because it "dispenses with a reasoned
examination of political situations, of their causes and consequences. "'1
International lawpersons who have struggled over many generations to
fashion approaches towards an acceptable normative description of
"terrorism" may find this insight congenial.11 However, they know as well
as the philosophers the difficulties that attend "reasoned examination of
political situations"; there remain at hand many diverse reasoned analyses
that frame very different understanding of the causes and consequences of
"terrorism." They may, however, feel perplexed by Alain Badiou's
accentuation of "reasoned examination," on the one hand, and his further
analysis, on the other, of the ways in which the "crime of New York and the
following battles" constitute the "disjunctive synthesis of two nihilisms.' 12
The overall result of both the "wars" then, for Badiou, remains a register
constituted by the "bloody and nihilistic games of power without purpose
and without truth., 13 If so, understanding "terror" in ways that destruct
"the circuits of nihilism"'14 constitutes a new task for philosophers,
international lawpersons, and human rights activism.
The task is formidable because the two "wars" may not be read
9 Ibid. at 337.
10 Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy (London: Continuum Books, 2003) at 145.
Badiou's indictment of the word "terrorism" as a propagandistic term has been echoed in recent
literature. Tomis Kapitan, for example, suggests that "'terrorism' is simply the current vogue for
discrediting one's opponents before the risky business of inquiry into their complaints can even begin.
If individuals and groups are portrayed as irrational, barbaric, and beyond the pale of negotiation and
compromise, then askingwhy they resort to terrorism is viewed as pointless, needlessly accommodating,
or, at best, mere pathological curiosity." See Tomis Kapitan, "The Terrorism of Terrorism" in James
P. Sterba, ed., Terrorism and International Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 47 at 52.
11 See the discussion by Susan Tiefenbrun, "A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of
Terrorism" (2003) 9 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 357.
12 Supra note 10 at 158 [Emphasis in original].
13 Ibid. at 160.
14 Ibid. at 162.
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wholly as an affair of rational desire; political passion and religious
sentiment also enter the production of incumbent and insurgent politics.
Neither the causes nor the "terror"/"terrorism" itself may be ever thus fully
understood within "the critical obsession, and the narrow form of
judgement" of the Enlightenment rationality paradigms.1 5 Because of this,
international lawpersons and activists need to resituate their duty with
Badiou, and alongside philosophers, "to rationally reconstitute the reserve
of the affirmative infinity that every liberating project requires."16
Lest this may seem too formidable an invite for some of us, allow
me to cite the fulfilment of more than a century of activist politics of
hope-culminating in the institutionalization of the International Criminal
Court or, in a related but distinct context, the emergence of a feminist
paradigm of human rights-as testifying to the praxes of liberational
recourse to modes of "affirmative infinity." This demonstrates the truth of
the Badiou maxim: "one single thought has an immensity far beyond any
judgement.' 7 The sovereign question both for law and philosophy is then,
perhaps: What may constitute this immensity of thought in the ongoing war
on and of terror?
For Badiou, philosophy perhaps offers the beginning of an
approach to a "right" answer: "Philosophy," he writes, "exists solely insofar
as it extracts concepts from a historical pressure which would grant them
nothing other than a relative sense."' 8 International lawpersons may
perhaps aid philosophy in this task, but their own craft remains better
suited to providing an understanding of this "historic pressure" and
"relative sense" of strategic concepts imbricated by the politics of
dominance and of resistance. Put another way, they are apt to relate
"terror"/"terrorism" in terms of the related concepts already made
available by processes of historic pressures-conceptions such as "human
rights," "global governance," "international rule of law," and "global
justice""-no matter how these may stand misappropriated in the discourse
concerning the two "wars." In contrast, both international lawyers and
philosophers also need to more fully understand from historians of
15 Ibid. at 163.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18Ibid. at 130.
19 Already, the discourse stands framed in terms of "international ethics" and "international
justice." As to the former (though not directly addressed to the problematic of terror), see Charles R.
Beitz et al., eds., International Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). As to the latter, see
Sterba, supra note 10.
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terrorism that the quest for causes may indeed be futile. °
The question of justification for either form of war remains
intractable. As concerns the use of force by state entities, deliberation and
reflexive reason has focussed on the thematic of just war in all its three
moments: jus ad bello, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. The war on terror
has been, as we see later, subjected to strict scrutiny in terms of the
"justice" of ends and means in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the moment, I
wish to illustrate the extraordinary complexity and contradiction ushered
in by the two wars in terms of justification by juxtaposing two extraordinary
articulations. The first stands furnished by a contemporary but pre-9/11
text, provided by the 1998 World Islamic Council'sfatwa (of which Osama
bin Laden was a co-author) that urges all Muslims
to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military ... in any country in which it is
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Asqa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Holy
Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands
of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. ... We-with God's help-call on
every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order
to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also
call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops
and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so
that they may learn a lesson."1
Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain furnishes the second
text:
As the world's superpower, America bears the responsibility to help guarantee ...
international stability, whether much of the world wants it or not. This does not mean that
20 Thus, Walter Laqueur has shown by scrupulous research in the histories of "terrorism" that
neither exploitation, nor impoverishment, nor class subjugation (among other factors) causally correlate
with occurrence of "terrorist" acts and performances. See Laqueur, Terrorism, supra note 1. Indeed,
Laqueur finds that "terrorism, however justified the grievances of its proponents, has under no
circumstances succeeded against effective dictatorship; it has not managed to weaken it, modify its
policies or affect its course of action in any way. If terrorism has had any success at all, it has been
against democratic governments and ineffective, meaning obsolete or halfhearted, dictatorships" (ibid.
at 147). This observation may only hold if the success of many an anticolonial struggle with components
of "terrorism" is read only within the context of "obsolete" or "halfhearted" dictatorships. Nor does this
observation help any full understanding of the "terrorist" performances under the circumstance of
postcoloniality. Space forbids any elaboration of this contention, but for a more detailed historically
specific narrative see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National
Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
21 Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America (Roseville, Cal.: Prima,
2001) at 226-27. See also J.M.B. Porter, "Osama Bin-Laden, Jih~d, and Sources of International
Terrorism" (2003) 13 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 871; Jane Corbin, The Base: In Search of
Al-Qaeda-The TerrorNetwork That Shook the World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). See further
the insightful analysis by Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A
Short Legal History" (2003) 27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 299.
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we can or should rush around imposing "solutions" everywhere. It does mean that we are
obliged to evaluate all cries for justice and relief from people who are being preyed upon,
whether by nonstate marauders (like terrorists) or by state-sponsored enforcers. We, the
powerful, must respond to attacks against persons who cannot defend themselves because
they, like us, are human beings, hence equal in regard to us, and because they, like us, are
members of states, or would-be states, whose primary obligation is to protect the lives of
those who inhabit their polities."
Space forbids a detailed exegesis of both these texts, which offer an
ethic of justification for recourse to terror wars. The first text, lacking (at
least in my considered view) any authoritative grounding in the shari'a
tradition, offers dubious constructions of sacred cosmic duty addressed to
each pious Muslim individual23; at best, it furnishes a clue to some
understanding of historic grievances. The text is, after all, geared to a
violent struggle to reverse some monumental wrongs, and practice of
violence or "terror" is legitimated only by pedagogy ("so that they may
learn a lesson"). The second text offers a secular justification addressed
primarily to the foreign policy of the surviving superpower. If in the first
text, the violently constituted subaltern peoples carry the burden of
fulfilling a sacred duty to conduct highly individualized "war of terror," the
second text redefines a newjus cosmopoliticum for a new Pax Americana.
The authority for the second text comes from the notion that imperial
power creates an arc of global responsibility for all suffering and rightless
human beings and communities. As a superpower, the United States thus
bears the highest moral responsibility to protect the weak, assist the
defenceless, and vanquish wicked and tyrannical state and non-state
"enforcers." Both the texts, though differently, "justify" aggression and
violence as means of last recourse. But whereas the first text speaks of the
duty of each pious individual, the second results in an Elshtain-type claim
that all persons everywhere in this wide world may make an "equal claim
... to having coercive force deployed in their behalf if they are victims of
one of the many horrors attendant upon radical political instability."24 At
issue, all over again, remains the cause/effect question: What if these
2 2 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just WarAgainst Terror: The Burden ofAmerican Powerin a Violent World
(New York: Basic Books, 2003) at 169-70. One may scarcely fail to note the close and uncanny family
resemblance between this text and the inauguration speech marking the second installation of President
George Walker Bush. See The White House, News Release, "President Sworn-In to Second Term" (20
January 2005) online: The White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/01/20050120-1.html>.
23 See the insightful analysis by Freamon, supra note 21. See also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im,
"Upholding International Legality Against Islamic and American Jihad" in Booth & Dunne,supra note
4, 162. In a different vein, see Zayn Kassam, "Can a Muslim Be a Terrorist?" in Sterba, supra note 10,
114.
24 Elshtain, supra note 22 at 168.
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"horrors" are indeed produced by the very Good Samaritan global
hegemon that now further stands attributed with large, devious, delirious,
delusionary, overwhelming, globally pernicious, and even historically
impossible ethical "burdens" to cure the accursed state of affairs?
II. "TERROR" AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A vexed question raised by proponents of both the "wars" is how
international lawyers and lawpersons may make sense of the relationship
between "terror" and human rights. Is deliberate infliction of indiscriminate
violence by insurgent non-state actors against civilian populations and sites
ever justified as a means of restoring their own human rights estates, and
making these somehow secure for the contingent future?2 5 This important
question has not been fully addressed by either philosophers or
international lawpersons.
Analytically, at least three strategies remain available for a
consideration of this question. The first suggests the need to distinguish the
perspectives of the agents of such violent recourse from those who are
directly or indirectly harmed and hurt by them. Even when the perpetrator-
oriented perspective suggests scenarios of long-term overall collective
enhancement of human rights (that is, the promotion, protection,
enjoyment, and realization of human rights), terrorist violence remains
simply unjustifiable from the victim-oriented perspective. 6 The same result
follows a second strategy, named as "ethical peace," which insists in
principle that human rights as a whole ought not be advanced by recourse
to collective political violence, especially through forms of "terrorism."27
This otherwise laudable approach discounts (perhaps on some sort of
Humean view, which insists that moral "ought" may never flow from an
25 Of course, the issue of collateral damage is as vexed as the necessary distinctions between
combatants and non-combatants, and deliberateness and internationality. See Shannon B. French,
"Murderers, Not Warriors: The Moral Distinction Between Terrorists and Legitimate Fighters in
Asymmetric Conflicts" in Sterba, supra note 10, 1. Leon Trotsky's defence of Red Terror, contesting
such distinctions, has been subjected to a searching criticism. See Igor Primoratz, "The Morality of
Terrorism" (1997) 14 J. Applied Phil. 221 at 225-28.
26 See Primoratz, ibid. at 230.
27 See Anthony Burke, "Just War or Ethical Peace: Moral Discourse of Strategic Violence" (2004)
80 Int'l Aff. 329. This approach rejects the just war paradigm of "prima facie acceptance of the
legitimacy of strategic violence," instead, "making peace-however complex, difficult and delayed-its
central normative goal" (ibid. at 349). It "assumes that if the short- to medium-term existence of
strategic violence is to be accepted, it must only be conditional, and used only under conditions far more
stringent, enforceable and morally consistent than have so far been provided by either just war theory
or international law" (ibid. at 350). I may note here parenthetically that the theory and practice of
Mohandas Gandhi remains crucially relevant to further development of the theory of ethical peace.
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existential or empirical "is") the considerable historical jurisgenerative
evidence establishing the fact that the practices of the collective often
furnish the very matrix for human rights generation. 28 The third strategy,
which I attend to here in some detail, urges that context-sensitive
distinctions ought to guide our reflexive labours.
Context-sensitive narratives pose issues of justification for
"terrorist" violence in terms of possible distinctions between justifications
for within-nation insurgent violence and its across-nations "global"
practices. Some within-nation "terrorist" recourse may be held justifiable
in terms of what Allen Buchanan calls the problematic morality of
secession,29  as well as in the related contexts of de-colonization
movements. ° Many of us may share or develop justifications for
"terrorism," were it historically possible, in contexts such as "genocidal" or
"ethnic cleansing" state formations. Likewise, we may want to share or
develop justifications for insurgent "terrorism" in situations such as the
(happily) erstwhile apartheid South African state formation. However, any
extension of such justifications in across-nations acts of "terrorist" violence
remains fraught with difficulties already illustrated by the fatwa instanced
in the preceding section. The injustices of globalized racism are, of course,
real (as experienced by their victims or, more often, by their next of kin).
Yet, these scarcely offer self-evident and ethically decisive justifications for
recourse to mass international "terrorism., 3'
Virginia Held remains a foremost exemplar amongst a few
philosophers who resolutely engage moral justifications of within-nation
insurgent "terrorist" recourse. She concedes that such recourse indeed
violates the human rights of those caught within the crossfire of its
practices, but advocates a severely limited justification based on a distinct
281 have attempted, however, to suggest precisely this. See Upendra Baxi, "The Right to Be, and
to Remain, Human" in Upendra Baxi, Geeti Sen & Jeanette Fernandes, eds., The Right to Be Human
(New Delhi, Lancer International for Indian International Centre, 1987), reprinted in Upendra Baxi,
Inhuman Wrongs and Human Rights: Unconventional Essays (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1994) at 1-18.
2 9 Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).
30 See generally Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Malden, Mass.:
Blackwell, 2001); David Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Life (London: Granta, 2000).
31 Starkly put, those who advocate recourse to insurgent measures of "terrorism" against
institutionalized racism or genocidal trends in global governance formations do not marshal any instant
justification in their recourse to the 9/11 type performances. Even the most radical human rights activist
formations do not go so far as to "justify" violent insurgent global terrorist recourse against sites of
international financial institutions or the siege social of transnational corporations. To take another
illustrative domain, eco-warriors that combat eco-fiends in confronting contemporary "eco-terrorism"
or militant or "extremist" animal rights movements enduringly face many a justificatory difficulty.
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logic of distributive justice. Her argument is too complex to be neatly
summarized, but overall (and in a "phrase regime" that she may not, after
all, endorse) it amounts to this: a limited recourse to "terrorism" remains
justifiable when transitionally directed to forms of violent dispossession of
the "haves" in a nation-society by the human rights "have-nots." In its
ostensible respect for human rights of everyone it, at the same time, causes
and constructs legitimation of cascading forms of vast human rightlessness.
This justification is grounded on the insight that: "If we must have rights
violations, a more equitable distribution of such violations is better than a
less equitable distribution."32 Within-nation insurgent collective political
violence thus passes the initial justificatory threshold. The question remains
whether this passage holds equally true of a further movement of
justification for acts and performances of mass international/global
"terrorism."
A move from a high ethical discursive platform to the messy
production of the United Nations orchestrated denunciation of terrorism
remains here necessary. A General Assembly resolution in 2000 (which
occurred in close proximity of the preparations and performances of the
Golden Jubilee of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), expressing
serious concern with "the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by
terrorist groups," insists that "acts of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations" are "aimed at the destruction of human rights" and at a
creation of "an environment that destroys the right of people to live in
freedom from fear."33 It also reaffirms that "all measures to counter
32Virginia Held, "Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals" in R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris,
eds., Violence, Terrorism, and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 59 at 80. One must
also fully attend to the rather remarkably detailed analysis in Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International
Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Straddling rather
uncomfortably, but understandably, both within-nation and cross-border "terrorism" as "unconventional
violence," Frost suggests the possibility of justification for such acts of violence "when it is possible to
interpret them as acts of communication from those who have been unjustly treated aimed at those who
have systematically denied the people in question the opportunity of having their case heard" (ibid. at
213). In particular, even including indiscriminate acts of "terrorist" violence, "such extreme acts of
communication" remain "justifiable when they are of such a nature that they demonstrate an ongoing
commitment to the corpus of settled norms by which they judge that an injustice has been done them"
(ibid.). Frost wrote before the happenings of the two terror wars, which, in my opinion (which I may not
elaborate here because of space constraints), altogether shatter his principal constitutive "background
theory" assumptions and the corpus of "settled norms" that he offers. Because I may be erroneous in
my critique, I here invite some Frost-friendly anxious revisitation of his "constitutive theory" of ethics
in international relations.
33 See Human Rights and Terrorism, GA Res. 54/164, UN GAOR, 54"' Sess., Agenda Item 116(b),
UN Doc. A/ Res/54/164 (2000). I do not here attend to a similar logic animating the Security Council
Resolutions. Concerning such resolutions see Bardo Fassbender, "The UN Security Council and
Terrorism" in Andrea Bianchi, ed., Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Portland:
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terrorism must be in strict conformity with the relevant provisions of
international law including international human rights standards."34 The
subsequent 2002 resolution of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights
articulates a conviction that "terrorism" can "never be justified in any
instance, including as a means to promote and protect human rights., 35 This
denunciation expediently ignores the necessary distinctions between within-
nation indiscriminate violence targeting non-complicit civilians, justified by
"terrorists" as "propaganda by deed,, 36 and enduring state terrorism that
inveterately seeks to justify its standardless use of force against "terrorists"
(and their kins, the "insurgents") as an aspect of the pursuit of the common
good of collective human security. The "heroes" and "villains" of both the
"wars" still vociferously justify their aggression, and even brutality, by the
"justice" of their own cause. But the insinuation of human rights
normativity in the very discourse on "terrorism" does indeed problematize
the violent hegemonies constructed to aid and assist standardless use of
force on either side.
Accordingly, the softest dimension-the preambulatory recital-of
the "soft" law of the above cited Sub-Commission on Human Rights
resolution deserves a full quotation. The Sub-Commission proceeds with
the following recitals:
Regretting that the negative impact of terrorism, in all its dimensions, on human rights
continues to remain alarming despite national and international efforts to combat it,
Convinced that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever
committed, can never be justified in any instance, including as a means to promote and
protect human rights,
Bearing in mind that the most essential and basic human right is the right to life,
Bearing in mind also that terrorism creates an environment that destroys the freedom from
fear of the people,
Convinced that terrorism in many cases poses a severe challenge to democracy, civil society
and the rule of law,.
Hart, 2004) 83.
34 Ibid.
35 Terrorism and human rights, ESC Res. 37, 54" Sess., UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2002/24
(2002).
36 See Laqueur, Terrorism, supra note 1 at 71-77 for a revisitation of Bhagat Singh's tract, "The
Philosophy of the Bomb."
3 7 Supra note 35.
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The first preambulatory recital, by its reference to the negative
aspects of "terrorism," may suggest a reverse potential for its positive
aspects. But the second preambulatory recital discredits "terrorism" (here
the use of insurgent collective political violence) "as a means to promote
and protect human rights." The fifth recital christens it as a "severe
challenge to democracy, civil society and the rule of law." The sixth, and
last, recital assails all purported justifications of "terrorism" as creating a
sustained "environment that destroys the freedom from fear of the people."
However, a reading of the term "terrorism" that is also inclusive of state
terrorism (regardless of any collective authorial intent and even the
contextuality of the enunciation) would also problematize, if not destroy,
all basis of justification for some inhumane measures of counter-terrorism,
made poignantly familiar by Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.38 Note that the
General Assembly Resolution addresses "the negative impact of terrorism,
in all its dimensions, on human rights" as well as "terrorism, in all its forms
and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed." Counter-
terrorism measures and policies certainly fall within this description, as do
state "terrorist" acts. Extra-judicial executions of suspected "terrorists,"
indefinite preventive detention, custodial torture, degrading or inhuman
treatment, secret trials, and similar horrors thus also pose a "severe
challenge to democracy, civil society and the rule of law" and enhance the
"environment that destroys the freedom from fear of the people." Any
privileged reading the Sub-Commission Resolution thus fosters logics of a
hermeneutic of suspicion as well as, hopefully, a hermeneutic of retrieval.39
III. THE MOVEMENT FROM STATE "TERROR" TO THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF NON-STATE "TERROR"
We may note at the outset the fact that what marks the post-9/11
movement from combatting the crime of "terrorism" to the "war on terror"
are not so much the ideological assemblages (in their protean Deleuze-
38 See the interesting analysis in Kim Lane Scheppele, "All the Clauses, but One: An Analysis of
the Government Legal Opinions for Conducting the War on Terrorism" (Paper presented to the Penn.
Law Conference on Homeland Security & Civil Liberties, June 2004) [unpublished]. See also Silvia
Borelli, "The Treatment of Terrorist Suspects Captured Aboard: Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law" in Bianchi, supra note 33, 39.
For the evocation of these terms in the context of reflexive modernization see Scott Lash,
"Reflexivity and its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community" in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens &
Scott Lash, eds., Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modem Social Order
(Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1994) 110.
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Guattari senses4 ), but the cultivated politics of fear, and even dread, of
access by nomadic multitudes to the weaponry of mass destruction, hitherto
(and still) considered legitimate and safe only with the five global aggressive
incumbents-the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The war on
terror is now based on this dread, this cultivated paranoia of potential
acquisition of "weapons of mass destruction" by agents and forces of the
non-"liberal" societies (both incumbents and insurgents).
Walter Laqueur now articulates the "war of terror" in terms of "the
emergence of new kinds of terrorist violence, some based on ecological and
quasireligious concerns, others basically criminal in character, and still
others mixtures of these and other influences," animated by "all kinds of
religious-sectarian-nationalist convictions ... taking on a millenarian and
apocalyptic tone."41 The former director of the CIA, R. James Woosley, in
providing the front cover blurb to the paperback edition of Laqueur's book
("If you read only one book on terrorism, this should be it"), obviously
altogether missed the fine print that insists that "most terrorist groups ...
probably will not" use "weapons of mass destruction" with "incalculable,"
and possibly "devastating" consequences. The probability that the
insurgents may have capabilities and intentionalities to deploy the
weaponry of mass destruction (conventional, biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons) against the aggressive global incumbents constitutes the
founding myth of the "war on terror." Like all myths it provides a new
powerful political language (Roland Barthes, quite sometime ago,
reminded us of this function of the "modern" myth43) that forever serves
the strategic interests of the state that, always in struggle with its own
nomadic "war machine,"" now stands equally confronted with the nomadic
40 See generally Gilles Deleuze & F61ix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism &
Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: Univeristy of Minnesota Press, 1987).
"Assemblages," they insist, "are passional, they are compositions of desire. Desire has nothing to do
with a natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled, desire" (ibid.
at 399).
41 The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and theArms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999) at 4-5. These telltale neologisms cancel altogether the agency of the insurgent potential of
making any kind of political statement through horrific violent means, but reserve in all plenitude the
very same rights of the hastily cobbled together, and somewhat amorphous, "coalitions of willing states,"
a narrative that I may not fully pursue here.
42 Ibid. at 4.
4 3 Mythologies, trans. by Annette Lavers (New York: Hill & Wang, 1972).
44 See Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 38 at 351-423. A very close reading of this difficult text
helps one understand the distinction and relationship of the state and the "war machine." The state is
not the "war machine," liable to be "confused with the line of State domination," but, rather, the "war
machine" is "exterior" to it (ibid. at 354). Indeed, "War machines take shape against the apparatuses
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''war machine" of insurgent "terror" through suicide bombers (a site and
a process that steadily converts sacrificial human bodies into networks of
weapons of mass destruction). All this now heavily complicates, and with
deep misfortune for human rights, justificatory discourse concerning
insurgent, state, and retaliatory forms of the across-nation "terrorisms."
An unusual mix of propaganda, politics, and policy, which
structured the world community's pre-9/11 reticence to define the
phenomenon of "terror"/"terrorism," has now given way to the new, rather
encyclopaedic, post-9/11 legislative exuberance towards defining its
modes.45 Indeed, prior to 9/11, both the incumbents and the "nomadic"
insurgents understood "terror" in a different way.46 Summarily put, "terror"
signified within-nation practices of collective political violence by some
insurgent state actors against the duly, or more routinely unduly,
constituted regimes of political domination. By the common consent and
conduct of "civilized nations," "terror" was an exclusive term of description
reserved for the practices of non-state, and insurgent, violence. By
definition, such violence/force, within and across the international law
constituted borders and boundaries, was pronounced both illegitimate and
that appropriate the machine and make war their affair and their object" (ibid. at 423).
45 Concerning the earlier reticence to define terrorism, see Alex Obote-Odora, "Defining
International Terrorism" (1999) 6 Murdoch U.E.J.L. 1. But see Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, Strengthening International Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Preventing and
Combating Terrorism, UN ESCOR, 13th Sess., UN Doc. E/CN.15/2004/8 (2004). See also Bianchi,supra
note 33 at 3-24,103-212,283-307,491-534; Christopher C. Joyner, "The United Nations and Terrorism:
Rethinking Legal Tensions Between National Security, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties" (2004) 5
Int'l Stud. Perspective 240; and James Thuo Gathii, "Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and
International Law" (2003) 67 Alb. L. Rev. 335.
46 See the magisterial presentation by Laqueur, Terrorism, supra note 1.
47 That this was not always so is hinted at by Alain Badiou in a reference to the Jacobins during
the French Revolution who "had no problem in declaring themelseves 'terrorists."' See Badiou, supra
note 10 at 144. Badiou thinks it remarkable that "the word 'terrorism,' which clearly qualified a
particular figure of the exercise of State power, has come, little by little, to signify exactly the contrary"
(ibid.). This understanding, of course, ignores other insurgencies against the state/civil society orderings
that sustain vicious orders of patriarchy. For example, Claudia Card insists that the "stereotype" of
insurgent political "terrorism" does not merely ignore "state terrorism," but also "terrorism in the home
and the terrorism of rape, both stranger and acquaintance rape, with which women and girls are left to
cope routinely, even in many states that are considered relatively secure from external attack." See
Claudia Card, "Making War on Terrorism in Response to 9/11" in Sterba, supra note 10, 170 at 179.
Likewise, the deep ecology activism speaks of "eco-terrorism" regarding the contemporary forms of
global capitalism, and militant animal right movements retaliate against forms of technoscience
"terrorism" that impose mindless cruelty on sentient experimental animals. Peoples living with disability
have yet to christen their violent stigmatization as a structural instance of state/civil society "terrorism."
The lesbigay transgender communities similarly have to adopt the languages of protest against
homophobic "terrorism." The naming of equivalent chains of "terrorisms" remains a difficult future
task.
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illegal. International law discursivity concerning "terrorism" was revived
only after 9/11, even though a General Assembly Resolution in 1970 (not
reiterated by the Security Council until 1998 in Resolution 1189) had
configured the landscape in terms of international obligations of all
member-states: "to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in ... terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such
acts.
48
Understandably, approaches to definitions of "terrorism" in the
long decades preceding the 9/11 era-manifest in the twelve pre-9/11 UN
instruments 9-are unable to accommodate this epistemic shift from the
paradigm of within-nation to across-nation acts of "terror." Even the North
States were loathe to define "terrorism" and thus furnished, in a pre-9/11
world ordering, an indifferent archive of ratification and implementation.
Clearly, any adherence to the spirit and letter of the 1970 General
Assembly Resolution would have made the hot pursuit of the Cold War
both illegitimate and illegal. On any sensible human rights reading of it, the
Cold War, in its many phases, materialized itself worldwide only through
such territorially based serial, and cumulative, performative "terrorist acts."
At the same time, the 1970 General Assembly textualties enabled and
empowered the sanitizing distinctions between within-nation and
international "terrorism."
Additional aggravations stood both posed and furnished in
negotiation of approaches to "state terrorism" in recourse to, and conduct
of, "war" and "warlike" manifestations of inter-state violence. War, and
warlike hostilities, as Emmanuel Levinas teaches us all, "renders morality
48 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), GAOR, 25 h
Sess., UN Doc. A/8082 (1970) 121 at 123.
The UN conventions on terrorism are: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 1988; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970;
Convention on Offences and Certain OtherActs Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963; Convention on the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991; Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, 1980; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973; International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, 1979; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997; International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999; Protocol for the Suppression of
UnlawfulActs against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988; and Protocol
for the Suppression of UnlawfulActs of Violence at Airports Serving International CivilA viation, 1988. See
generally Bianchi, supra note 33.
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derisory," especially when "enjoined as the very exercise of reason."5 Its
ultimate obscenity sustains the "suspension of the ethical" and conduct
hostile to human rights. International lawyers, the heirs of Hugo Grotius,
remain familiar with the drudgery of the complex, cruel, and contradictory
tasks-that is, of the hermeneutic production of international outlawry of
"war" (outside the customary regimes of self-defence), of the just regimes
of "humanitarian intervention," and of the constant rewriting/negotiation
of the norms of "proportionality" and "reasonableness" in any justifiable
use of force-in the development of distinctions that confined waging and
conduct of war, or war-like hostilities, through the discursive normativity of
jus in bello, jus ad bellum, and, to some extent, jus post bellum5 1 But at no
stage does "state terrorism" emerge as a figuration of thought in the
evolution of the genres of the international law of war and humanitarian
law, the customary and conventional right to self-defence, and the limits of
conduct of belligerent or military occupation. Unsurprisingly, the term
"state terrorism" is, as yet, not a term of art in either international law
diction or the United Nations' official epistemology; at best some
communities of human rights activists use it.
52
And yet Euroamerican "state terrorism" was the rule, not the
exception. I believe that all participants in the Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) discourse ought to examine the histories of the
colonial wars of "terror"; whether the histories of chattel slavery in human
beings, the savage treatment of indigenous peoples during colonization, or
the myriad forms of colonial conquest, subjugation, occupation, and
apartheid. Their sense of history of the making of the modern international
law may no longer escape the burdens of understanding and explicating
fully the formative histories of "white terror." Likewise we may also speak
of the "brown," "black," "yellow," or "red" cross-border regimes of
"terror." Political correctness now forbids any revisitation of colonialism,
apartheid, and the Cold War regimes as "terrorist" regimes lest this may
entail "racial" or "ethnic" stereotypes and revive impermissible forms of
xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance. But neither may the forms of
50Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969) at 21.
51 See generally Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977) [walzer, Just and Unjust Wars]; Michael Walzer, Arguing
about War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004) [Walzer, Arguing about War].
52 It remains arguable though that the Statute of the International Criminal Court now articulates
variously the abhorrent practices of state terrorisms through the reconstituted categories of crimes
against humanity. See Antonio Cassese, "Terrorism as International Crime" in Bianchi, supra note 33,
213.
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censorship, thus imposed, gainsay the inherent racism of modern
international law.53 In any event, the newly instituted official prose of the
"war on terror" now presents a "clear and present danger" to the otherwise
much vaunted ontological robustness of human rights and fundamental
freedoms (which enshrine near-absolute rights to freedom of speech and
expression) through the mindless conversion of forms of free speech into
hate speech and honest democratic dissent into potential treason, as well
as the new Panopticon of digital "data mining."54
I may not pursue here (for reasons both of space and competence)
the precise ways in which the (hopefully) old-style state "terrorism"
represents itself, or opens itself up to representation, as the "war of terror."
But I must at least note here that this war has its principal agents-the
"nomadic" multitudes5 5 of non-state actors-deploying indiscriminate
orders of mass violence, justifying their militant exertions as responses to
the combined and uneven axes of development of the manifold forms and
practices of "state terrorism," and ideologizing their violence as multiplex
"emancipation" from the terrors of the Westphalian, and now so-called
post-Westphalian, imperial global state formations. What this "war of
terror," in 9/11 formats, desperately seeks to destroy is the new ordering of
PaxAmericana and its imperial politics of denial of difference. The politics
of the war of terror depict indiscriminate killing of the "enemies"
everywhere in terms of a global jihad against the reproduction of an
American Empire that, in its scramble for oil and petroleum resources,
bolsters tyrannical regimes worldwide, and especially in the Middle East,
thus thriving on "petro-violence. '5 6 Its enactments of forms of violent global
"justice" fulsomely repudiate what it considers to be the "Westoxification"
of the contemporary world, a form that annihilates religious and
civilizational plurality.
The protagonists of the "war on terror" may, and some actually do,
contest these justifications that now insist that the "war of terror" also
53For a recent discussion see Patricia Tuitt, Race, Law, Resistance (London: Glasshouse, 2004).
54See Samuel Dash, The Intruders: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures from Ki'ng John to John
Ashcroft (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2004); Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd:
Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004).
55 See Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Multitude: Warand Democracy in theAge of Empire (New
York: Penguin Books, 2004). A more complex understanding of this notion is offered by Paolo Virno,
A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. by Isabella Bertoletti,
James Cascaito & Andrea Casson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004).
56 See Michael Watts, "Petro-Violence: Community, Extraction, and Political Ecology of a Mythic
Commodity" in Nancy Lee Peluso & Michael Watts, eds., (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001)
189.
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ought to follow some just-war type paradigmatic restraints. One may thus,
in the first place, maintain that the agents of the war of terror, even when
they consider recourse to acts of "terror" as somehow justified, ought to
exhaust all available peaceful means for the righting of wrongs. Violent
recourse must be the recourse in the last instance. This "determination in
the last instance" (to adapt a phrase of Louis Althusser from a different
context 57) entails some reflexive ethical labour on the part of these agents,
conceived, of course, as moral agents. Second, the onus of proof, or the
burden of moral justification, for the incitement or perpetration of acts of
"terror" ought to weigh heavily with their agents. Third, such agents ought
to consider on various grounds the relation between the ends and the
means. A disproportionate and unreasonable use of violence (the means)
may defeat their ends (howsoever conceived). Put another way, their
violence ought to follow some version of Paretian optimality, in which
everyone is better off and no one worse off by such recourse. Fourth, such
agents ought to at least adopt the medieval virtue of "chivalry," forbidding
the killing or wounding of infants and the aged, sick, infirm, and disabled,
the violation of women, and the worst forms of mercenary cruelty that
entail threats and actual performance of killing hostages where ransom, in
cash or kind, is not forthcoming. Any "terrorist" violence ought to fully
foreground its means (wanton acts of massacre or cruel, degrading, or
inhumane treatment that necessarily invite similar retaliation) in relation
to its ethical ends. This obligation ought to weigh especially heavily on
those agents of "terror" who base their justifications of violent performance
in terms of any privileged hermeneutic of religious ethic. Fifth, if the "war
of terror" is to be comprehensively described in terms of a "justified" and
necessarily violent critique of forms of contemporary global capitalism
(read globalization), its violent overthrow must, after all, remain an
ethically viable project, when all related projects remain celebrated only in
terms of funerary notes. Sixth, some order ofjus post bellum obligations
remain co-equally owed by agents of both the "wars."
Overall, and put another way, only an "ethical" discourse
concerning "terrorism" may justify acts of "terror" because outside this it
summons fully the "war on terror." Failure to accomplish this ethical/moral
feat entails precisely the endless reproduction and exchange of the
Badiouian "disjunctive" circuits of nihilistic violence. Put in yet another
way, the nomadic insurgents always bear the responsibility of producing a
superior morality/ethics than what remains available, in terms of
Realpolitik, to the aggressive incumbents.
57 See Louis Althusser & ttienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. by Ben Brewster (London:
Verso, 1979) at 216-24.
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The failure of nomadic multitudes to produce such an overall ethic
now justifies the dystopias of Realpolitik reinvention of the war on terror,
which summon heavily the imagined Utopias of human rights with all its
fierce plenitude of the languages, logics, and paralogics of human rights. In
the end, such diverse adversaries as Osama bin Laden and George W.
Bush/Tony Blair, even when locked in a mortal embrace, proclaim with
equally ferocious felicity the justifications for institutionalizing the
legitimation of the escalating violence in their distinctive pursuits,
celebrating the superiority of their own conceptions of a "just" world
ordering. "Death to the enemy," and privileged versions of the "final
solution," is their common slogan, enacted through the ever-escalating
orders of vicious violence. Both the forces conceive the future of world
orderings and of the future of human rights within these violent paradigms,
with equal orders of courage, craft, and contention.
In setting out these grand generalizations, we run not merely
theoretic narrative risks, but unfortunately also expose ourselves to an
invidious invitation to Guantanamo or Belmarsh or even their equally
hideous third-world counterparts. However, it remains necessary to probe
the schizoid-paranoid discourse of both the war on and of terror beyond the
obscenely assembled normative justifications of the cultures of impunity
thus variously harboured. Perhaps at no moment of human history are
patient and creative engagements with ethnographies of human suffering
and violation more imperative.58 What is imperative is to go beyond the
monological perversity of "either you are for or against us" type talk. The
stakes are far too high, I believe, to allow any indulgence in a Manichean-
type discourse contrasting, even conflating, the good and the evil. The
TWAIL epistemic and activist communities, baptized into ways of living
under conditions of "terror" in the Third World (whether inflicted by the
First World or in their autochthonous forms and formats), surely need no
North-dominated reminders concerning how they may proceed to address
these two "wars."
IV. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "OLD" INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The "classical" norms of the law of nations die many a death in the
process of the two "wars." Both of the "terror" wars voraciously devour-in
all their varied aftermaths and aftershocks-forms, contexts, histories,
58 See Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, "Terrorism, Myth, and the Power of Ethnographic Praxis"
(2001) 30 J. Contemp. Ethnography 520; Michael Herzfeld,Anthropology: Theoretical Practice in Culture
and Society (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001).
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symbolisms, significations, and standards of respect for international human
rights and humanitarian law. Both remain mired in what Alain Badiou
describes as "the disjunctive synthesis of two nihilisms,"59 which foster, on
the one hand, a violent-even aesthetic-taste for the politics of imperial
global hatred for nomadic multitudes and, on the other, the immense and
awesome politics of insurrectionary desire, animating the very diversely
enacted political hatred of the imperial, for example, by the diasporic
Palestinian peoples, the Chechnyan "rebels," and, even more cruelly, the
rather ineffable Al-Qaeda forces. The disorder of the violent articulation
of politics of desire for identity (and the often coerced associated practices
of identification that now haunt, on all sides, an uncertain global political
future of, and for, human rights) remains decisive on these consecratory
registers.6 °
What may both of the wars inaugurate by way of profound and
abiding human rights and humanitarian law destruction? Certainly, they
destroy the classic foundations of comity between nation-states; re-write
international law prohibition on recourse to aggression against equal
sovereign states; and erase almost entirely the distinctions between civilians
and combatants, and the painstakingly evolved regimes of limits of power
in circumstances of military or belligerent occupation. In a profound sense,
then, both of the wars constitute simultaneously a "war" on human rights
and humanitarian law, and remain liable to an indictment of being (and
becoming) "the war against pluralism."61 They seek to resituate the values
and visions of human rights within the circuits of collective human security,
defined primarily-if not wholly-in ways that serve the strategic interests
of the emerging American Empire and resistance to it. Further, as has been
often remarked (and with somewhat greater salience by Hardt-Negri), the
"war against terror" is a war without end; it is a war in which states, singly
and in concert, violently engage a whole range of amorphous and
cross-border non-state actors and networks; a war that may remain so
un-winnable on either side as to obliterate the very distinction drawing
bright lines between victory and defeat.
The ways in which this war stands waged also flattens historical
time, reducing many histories of multiple terrorisms to a single date (that
is, 9/11), summoning a singular reconstitution of global public memory that
simultaneously also organizes collective amnesia of sources and causes,
means and methods, ideologies, and structures of varieties of collective
59 Supra note 10 at 158-62.
60 See Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002).
61 See Robert L. Phillips, "The War Against Pluralism" in Sterba, supra note 10, 101.
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political violence called "terrorism." 9/11 and its continuing aftermaths also
entail some extraordinary representations of massive, often "Star Wars"
type, retaliatory response, which is justified by framing collective human
security as a global public good. This perspective instantly de-legitimates
acts and performances of mass international "terrorism" as feats achieving
the production of globalpublic bads. It also equally instantly legitimates the
global war on terror-as the reproduction of global public goods; the
recomposition of international relations, law, and organization; and the
installation, in the process, of both a messianic and Manichean ethic and
flows and networks of combined and uneven formations of counter-
"terrorism."
A new global ethno-nationalism, if one may so name this
happening, is now in the making; it proclaims some inherent virtues of
solidary global public citizenship, extending beyond bounds the celebrated
notion of "constitutional patriotism" adumbrated by Jurgen Habermas.62
Because each one of us may be enmeshed in serial performances of mass
political violence, each one of us also stands imperatively
encased/interpellated within the logics, paralogics, and languages of "war
on terror." These cultivate notions of public virtue in terms of a binary ethic
(either you are for or against terrorism) and its associated regimes of the
emerging positive global morality that seek to disarticulate any recourse to
critical morality in relation to the war on terror, in all its fierce and mighty
pursuit. Any ethical ambivalence stands condemned thus as complicitous
with "terror." This new global ethic in the making extravagantly forfeits and
squanders all potential for non-violent pursuit of the creation of dialogic
timeplaces, disarticulating alternate versions of international comity as a
global public good.
V. THE DESTRUCTION OF COMITY
Comity among nations is, indeed, a grudging virtue.63 Certain forms
of inter-state courtesy and good will, while not furnishing a source of
authoritative legal obligations, were, in the eye of recent history, a
62 See Jiirgen Habermas, "Appendix II: Citizenship and National Identity" in Jirgen Habermas,
ed., Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse of Law and Democracy, trans. by William
Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996) 491; Jiurgen Habermas, "The Postnational Constellation
and the Future of Democracy" in Max Pensky, ed., The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). See also John Erik Fossum, "Deep Diversity versus
Constitutional Patriotism: Taylor, Habermas and the Canadian Constitutional Crisis" (2001) 1
Ethnicities 179.
63 See Upendra Baxi, "Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability, and Private International
Law" (1999) 276 Recueil des Cours 297 at 403-05.
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Eurocentric virtue practised by "civilized" nations of the West in their
dealings inter se. It, of course, did not extend to their dealings with the rest
of the world. Its origins are notoriously multiplex and multiple; they may be
traced both to the era of European chivalry and the moral histories of the
feudal virtue of honour that so brutally, if unevenly, combined forms and
practices of interactions between colonizers and the colonized.64 The
development of comity was, however, a "whites-only" kind of virtue in
international relations. The "savage," the "barbarian," the "heathen," and
the "unenlightened" masses of peoples and their political organization were
placed outside the zones of comity, if only with a view to promote their
capabilities for "civilization" and eventual induction into the family of
nations. 6' Even so, beneficial access to the practice of comity by all co-equal
sovereign states and peoples now remains the foundation of a post-
Westphalian order; this is now exposed to severe interrogation, especially
by the United States.
Overall, comity performed certain useful tasks, establishing a
modicum of civility among nations, even in the post-Westphalian order
marked first by decolonization and now by current economic-globalization.
In particular, practising comity meant many orders of civility that informed
magisterial evolution of the law of armed conflicts. For example, classical
international law developed the practice of this virtue by requiring that the
intention to go to war be notified by a declaration of war; undeclared
hostilities or warfare were disfavoured. Customary international law stood
informed by comity considerations when it prescribed that the use of
force-even in situations of self-defence, reprisal, or retorsion-must be
both reasonable and proportionate. Comity also did much silent work in the
historical fashioning of the norms and standards of international
humanitarian law, governing treatment of prisoners of war, the sick and
wounded, and non-combatants caught in the vicious web of armed conflict.
The conduct of comity was also grounded in prudential considerations. If
the minimal ethical cooperation, even amidst armed conflicts, was to
become a sovereign norm, winning wars remained morally worthy only if
belligerent conduct retained a modicum of regard for the dignity and
decency that strove to minimize "unnecessary" human suffering, even when
"unnecessary" was interpellated within shifting grounds and doctrines of
military necessity. Further, the idea that war should be a matter of last
64 Historians of international law surely know that the practice of this virtue, and indeed
understandings of it, was derived by the colonizing and imperial powers from the subject nations and
peoples; but we must let this pass.
65 See Makau Mutua, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights" (2001)
42 Harv. Int'l L.J. 201.
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recourse was not altogether uninformed by the ethic of comity; after all, war
remained conceived of as a necessary contribution to some steady states of
peaceful cooperation among nations.
The ongoing war on terror now almost totally erodes this
institutionalized ethic of comity in international relations. The Taliban
regime in Afghanistan, for example, rather remarkably reasserted the genre
of classical comity norms when it insisted that the United States follow the
old, and classical, norms of comity in international law and relations that
rendered aggression a matter of last recourse. Following the classical
comity patterns, the regime asked for prima facie evidence that suggested
its complicity with Osama bin Laden; it assured that upon its production
and verification, it would do its governmental best to locate him and his
nefarious/multifarious associates; it then insisted that it would deliver them
to any Islamic nation for a public international criminal trial for the
commission of "crimes against humanity." None of these inherently dialogic
requests were heeded by the United States in the "light" of a pre-
determination to "discipline and punish" the Taliban.
No international due process obligations, informed by the
yesteryear virtue of comity, were thus owed to a regime once installed by
the very same superpower that observed these norms of comity rather
seriously in its earlier dealings with it. Fostered and deployed, once upon
a time, as a "progressive" force that led to an astonishing defeat of the
Soviet Empire, and co-opting, as is by now well known, Osama bin Laden,
and his cohorts, as allies in the Tom Clancy-like power plays between the
then two global superpowers, this regime is now presented as the post-Cold
War threat to a new Cold War solitary superpower. Osama, a one-time
darling of American foreign policy and secret service establishment,
became its mortal enemy when he attacked the might of the American
empire.
The American foreign-policy hawks insisted that the Taliban regime
was simply unworthy of any expedient enactments of revised editions of
international trustworthiness. It had forfeited that trust because it
"harboured" Osama and his cohorts, who planned and executed the attack
on the Twin Towers in New York and on the Pentagon. It did not matter
that this "harbouring" occurred under the auspices of some Northern
states. We know from fragmentary but still not unpersuasive accounts that
many a "terrorist" found a safe haven in countries of Europe and even the
United States. We now know that many European states were complicit,
whether through invigilatory inadvertence of the circulation of "terrorist"
personnel and resources, lax immigration laws (as for example in Belgium),
or safe money laundering havens provided through the Swiss banking
system and other dispersed tax havens in the First World. The notion of
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"harbouring" thus remains heavily Euroamerican-centric in the current
ongoing "war on terrorism.,
66
The conveniently indeterminate notion of harbouring also continues
to preside over the discovery or the invention of new "enemies" as
expediently elaborated by the global hegemon and its nomadic war
machine, an articulation which also include whole civilian populaces (I
write this in the devastating moment of Falluja) somehow suspected of
harbouring "terrorists." These remain exposed to means and methods of
search and destroy operations that altogether disregard the classical canons
of temeperamenta belli restraints. The unproved degrees of complicity of the
South states do not contemporaneously matter; it remains altogether
politically incorrect even to raise the question of the Euroamerican
harbouring and facilitation of the growth of "terrorist" networks before,
and in the run-up, of 9/11 violence. All that matters for the "war on terror"
are the ultimately contrived (as some conspiracy theorists would have us
believe) "intelligence-failed" reports concerning the nomadic, fugitive
presence of Osama bin Laden somewhere in Afghanistan, and his suspected
cohorts just about anywhere in the world. Sheer suspicion remains good
enough for the extraordinary, Star Wars type, military exertions directed to
the total devastation of almost everything in sight that remotely
approximates the "terrorist" presence and habitat. Did not, after all, Osama
claim authorship of the violent events of 9/11 from somewhere in
Afghanistan? This mere suspicion proved "good enough" for a threshold,
and even abiding, distrust of the Taliban regime, despite its claims to
capacity to deliver him to "justice." The regime, in any event, had to be
mightily liquidated forever in the hope that the process would somehow
yield Osama, alive or dead.67 In a sense, the inaugural act of the unfolding
"war on terror" marks the beginning of the anachronistic revival, in this
halcyon moment of hyper-globalization, of the medieval wars of revenge
and retaliation, where considerations of comity among nations remain
altogether ethically illegible. Thus begins the first chapter of the narrative
of the twenty first century enactment of a new medievalism.
Let us, for a moment, indulge in a counterfactual. Imagine a zodiac
in which the comity considerations prevailed, in which the dialogical
demands of the Taliban regime were subjected to a system of international
cooperation and verification, and in which an international regime would
66 See e.g. Michelangelica Scalabrino, "Fighting against International Terrorism: The Latin
American Experience" in Bianchi, supra note 33, 163.
67 pass by the recent extraordinary "appearance" of Osama bin Laden on Al-Jazeera on the eve
of the American presidential elections. Apparently, Osama alive emerges as a far more useful figure
than Osama dead!
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have backed the Taliban "good faith" assertions of the efforts to track down
the "terrorists."68 Assume further that working with the Taliban constituted
an estate of very limited trust, one in which specific deadlines for the
accomplishment of the mission were thus set, failures being visited by the
likes of the notoriously named Operation Infinite and Operation Enduring
Freedom. Assume further that any accompanying success would have left
open for negotiation the Taliban demand of delivery of Osama and his
cohorts to a more "friendly" Islamic state, or even a "neutral" non-Islamic
state, wholly amenable to the developing jurisprudence of international
criminal law. After all, even Libya had agreed to a trial in Scotland for the
Lockerbie disaster. Would such an exercise in renovated comity have left
the world an assuredly worse place compared, of course, with yet another
Afghan War that so disastrously took place? "What-if' questions are
notorious for posing and answering, but it remains the sovereign function
of comity ethic to foreground these.
Much the same, as future historians may vouchsafe for us, may be
said concerning Saddam Hussein; scarcely a redemptive human figuration,
and yet one for so long bolstered by the very same western powers and
leaders who even proceeded to condemn Israel's unilateral bombing of an
alleged nuclear reactor in Iraq as an unconscionable act of force. The
Security Council discourse at that moment displayed a solicitous regard for
unprovoked violation of the sovereignty of the Iraqi State. The Security
Council held that the mere Israeli suspicion that a nuclear power plant may
eventually be used to destroy the state of Israel did not furnish any
justification for a swift foul swoop that destroyed the installation. The logic
was that state entities, under international law, may not justifiably deploy
force under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence without overwhelming
evidence of existence of a hostile intent, actual verification of the existence
of weapons of mass destruction, and the ability to deploy these as a means
and an end for a brutal assertion of power. All this scarcely furnished any
ground for circumspection in the eventual unilateralist invasion of Iraq by
the coalition of the willing states in 2003, even despite discord among some
Permanent Members of the Security Council who insisted that a reasoned
latitude of time be accorded to Iraq to comply with various foundational
resolutions urging compliance with the destruction of weapons of mass
destruction. Iraq's submissions to the contrary notwithstanding, the United
States and the United Kingdom were, on all available evidence hitherto,
determined to the rather ferocious "disarmament war" against it. And the
postconflict "justifications" for this enormous use of force, and its rather
68 Much in the same way that now characterizes the relationship between the United States and
Pakistan, which some eminent Pakistani journalists now call the Bush-Mush bonhomie!
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devastating impact, remain untroubled by the global social fact that its own
commissions of enquiry at the highest level now altogether establish that
Iraq did not, after all, possess a semblance of evidence for the construction
and deployment of any orders of mass destruction weaponry.
The new normativity unleashed by the phrase-regimes of Operation
Infinite and Operation Enduring Freedom now furnishes the wherewithal
of a new "liberal" political theology (as Carl Schmitt named this69),
summated by the "war on terror," which, in turn, installs the exception as
the rule; where the jurisdiction of suspicion emerges as the foundational
ground ofjurisdiction of armed installation ofglobalpublic truths in ways that
bid an unwholesome adieu to earlier normativity of comity among nation-
states. The new comity stands defined in terms of arrogance of the power
of the solitary global hegemon. What remains decisive is not any truth of the
matter but the matter of truth, that is, the truths of political propaganda that
fatefully unleash acts and performances of the war on "terror." Given this,
it is unsurprising that "terrorist" groups and actors feel further empowered
to plead an order of justification for the awesome violence of the causes
and missions that they espouse.
VI. THE CREATION OF A "NEW" INTERNATIONAL LAW
New orders or imageries of international law always remain
violently birthed.7 ° It is unsurprising then that the international law now in
the making owes much to "the crime of New York," and that the war on
terror presents this as a decisive matrix for the making of the "new"
international law. It is being formed at two distinct but related levels: the
ideological/ethical and the juridico-political. Together, American
exceptionalism and the assertion of a right to preventive and pre-emptive
war constitute the cornerstone of the "new" international law. For the sake
of argument, the first is merely a variation on the theme of superpower
hegemony and the second has its own distinctive precedents in the Cuban
missile crisis and the Six-Day War.7' Even so, the present justificatory
69 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. by George
Schwab (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
70 This was the case with the struggle for decolonization that birthed the imagination of the
principle of self-determination decades before it emerged as an ambiguously common pursuit of the
ideal in the common Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December
1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).
Likewise, the creative normative insurgency of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained
birthed through the horrors of genocide and "total war" on Hiroshima-Nagasaki.
71As to the latter, see Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, supra note 48 at 80-85.
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narratives remain incomparable with past precedents.
American exceptionalism emerges as a curious mix of ethics and
ideology. As an ideological presentation, this amounts to spectacular
endeavours at justifying a "double standard" doctrine in a "world
dominated by a single 'hyper-power, ,,12 reaching an apotheosis in Robert
Kagan's celebration of a unipolar world where the United States acts as an
"international sheriff," policing "the lawless world where outlaws need to
be deterred or destroyed, often through the muzzle of a gun."7 3 This
remains relatively easy to demystify.74 More difficult to engage is the ethical
presentation as, for example, expounded by Elshtain," in which American
exceptionalism signifies not an ethical privilege but a moral duty of the
world's solitary surviving superpower. This does raise the question whether
this duty-that is, the United States' "unrestrained freedom to act ...
including the freedom to launch preventive wars against distant
threats-offers the world's best chance of fulfilling cosmopolitan values."76
May I venture to suggest that the agendum of future TWAIL labours, now
thus posed, entails the addressal of the hard, and harsh, task that focuses
a responsive and responsible counter-ethical critique?
At the technical juridico-political level, the foundations of the
''new" international law are being laid through a complex mosaic of the
individual and collective right to "preemptive" self-defence, justifications
for the use of United Nations unsanctioned use of force for the violent
achievement of "regime change," and the equally violent disregard for the
hitherto relatively settled norms of international humanitarian law.77 In
addition, at least three hermeneutic canons now stand proposed. First, the
"rogue" or "outlaw" states (howsoever determined, and, of course, this
72 See David Luban, "Preventive War" (2004) 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 207 at 237.
73 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York:
Knof, 2003) at 36-37.
74 1 agree here with the trenchant point by Luban, supra note 66 at 247 that "Kagan attributes a
kind of altruism to U.S. foreign policy that is hard to square with the historical record."
75 See text accompanying Elshtain, supra note 22.
76 Luban, supra note 66 at 248. See also Lea Brilmayer, "Realism Revisited: The Moral Priority
of Means and Ends in Anarchy" in Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer, eds., Global Justice (New York: New
York University Press, 1999) 192 at 192-215 [Brilmayer, "Realism Revisited"]; Lea Brilmayer,American
Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1994). Of course, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, supra note 48 remains an indispensable text, even if, in
the present circumstance, a rather tormenting one.
77 In sum, the "legalist paradigm" of just war offered in Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, supra note
48 at 58-73.
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decisively matters") need to be "disciplined and punished" by (howsoever
proclaimed) bearers of the values of international rule of law, human rights,
fundamental freedoms, and democracy. Second, the new "wars of terror"
render the earlier practices of reading the "hard" and "soft" international
law texts, in all their indeterminate intertextualities, somewhat, and at
moments even altogether, otiose. Third, rank consequentialism now
propounds itself as a new canon of rhetoric justification; the ouster of the
"evil regime" of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the recent "free and fair"
elections in Afghanistan now seem to fully justify all the Hydra-headed, and
accordingly monstrous, violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law, values, norms, and standards in the hot pursuit of the
"war on terror." Certainly, from a TWAIL perspective, these three features
innovating the global deliberative rationality present an immense reversal
of the historic third-world contribution to the making of the post-Second
World War international law normativity.
A. The Novel and Dangerous Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence
Centrally, this happening consists in the invention of the doctrine
of "preemptive" self-defence, somehow to be distinguished from the
individual and collective right of self-defence as understood prior to and
since Article 51 of the UN Charter. I do not here revisit the sky-high
doctrinal literature on the subject save to say that the claimed right to
preemptive self-defence is a recent, unique but wholly dubious, innovation
in international law.
79
The cognoscenti have already proclaimed that the invasion of Iraq
holds the potential not just for "transformation" of legal control over
international conflicts but also for its "destruction., 80 Thomas W. Franck
laments that this "preemptive" invasion shows that the regime of restraints
on use of force by states "has died again, and, this time, perhaps, for
78 For a normative justification, in terms of practical political reason for the foreign policy of
"well-ordered" peoples, see John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1999). See also perhaps the very last and, as always, the abiding discursive contribution by Jacques
Derrida, "The Last of the Rogue States: The 'Democracy to Come,' Opening in Two Turns" (2004) 103
S. Atl. Q. 323.
79 Even so, reference to some insightful explorations remains relevant. See especially Thomas M.
Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000); and Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1963).
80 See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, "Editor's Introduction" (2003) 97 Am. J. Int'l
L. 553.
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good.",8' He further suggests-rightly, in the present opinion-that it
heralds "a much broader plan to disable all supranational institutions and
the constraints of international law on national sovereignty. '8 2 Most
recently, the UN Secretary General pronounced the Iraq war as "illegal.,
83
Further, even as discerning a philosopher as Michael Walzer (who
endorsed on ethical grounds the justification offered for the Six-Day War,
1967, and the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor facility) now
declares the Iraq war as injustum bellum, injustum in bello, and injustum post
bello.84
Arrayed against this impressive consensus, stand some contrary
argumentation strategies that seek to justify the existence of such a right
with reference to the Cuban missile crisis85; no matter howsoever a weak
analogy, especially when read with the United Nations condemnation of the
Israeli air strike at the nuclear facility in Iraq,86 it remains arguable that
"new terrorism" may pose some extraordinary prospects of devastating use
of biological or nuclear "terrorist" action, no matter (as noted earlier) how
improbable. Cleverly and craftily constructed scenarios of future
"terrorism" thus aid and abet the primacy of the newly fangled discourse
concerning the international law sanctioned/sanctionable right of
"preemptive" war. How might the TWAIL, and other epistemic
81,"What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq" (2003) 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 607 at 610.
82 Ibid. See also Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous
Authorization to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime" (1999) 93 Am. J. Int'l L.
124; Michael Byers, "Preemptive Self-defense: Hegemony, Equality, and Strategies of Legal Change"
(2003) 11 J. Pol. Phil. 171; and Wade Mansell, "Goodbye to All That? The Rule of Law, International
Law, the United States, and the Use of Force" (2004) 31 J.L. & Soc'y 433.
83 The Secretary General categorically stated in a BBC interview that "from our point of view,
from the charter point of view," the Iraq war "was illegal." See "Iraq war illegal, says Annan"BBCNews
(16 September 2004), online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3661134.stm>.
8 4 Walzer,ArguingAbout War, supra note 48. See also Garry Wills, "What is a Just War?" The New
York Review of Books (18 November 2004) 32, online: The New York Review of Books
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17560>. See also Peacerights,"Report of the Inquiry into the Alleged
Commission of War Crimes by Coalition Forces in the Iraq War During 2003," online: McGill
University <http://www.law.mcgill.ca/news/attachments/2004-04-23-report-iraq.pdf>. This report by
eight international lawpersons examines the legality of the conduct of the Iraq War under the terms of
the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It has now been presented to the Prosecutor of the
Court for further necessary action.
85 See John C. Yoo, "International Law and the War of Iraq" (2003) 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 563. Yoo
here rather blithely presents as "facts" matters that remain unfortunately suspect as "propaganda." But
see George Farebrother & Nicholas Kollerstrom, The Case Against War: The Essential Legal Inquiries,
Opinions and JudgmentsConcerning War in Iraq (Hailsham, U.K.: Legal Inquiry Steering Group, 2003).
86 See Anthony D'amato, "Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor" (1983) 77 Am. J.
Int'l L. 584.
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communities, remain justified in their curt gestures of dismissal of this
discourse as merely ideological? Should they instead not attend more
closely to the ethical justifications and entailments? How may these critique
any good faith based recourse to a general "preventive war" doctrine? 87 In
particular, how may we critique this doctrine in terms of a more secure
future for human rights?
The overwhelming question still remains: How may the "war on
terror" proceed and which understanding of "reasonableness" and
"proportionality" of the use of force may legitimate this "war," both in its
conduct as "war" and its aftermath-the continuing belligerent occupation
(now exemplified in Iraq)-in the languages ofjuspost bellum? Faced with
this doctrinal disputation, some international lawpersons now suggest a
hasty and hurried bypass surgery that may wantonly cause the destruction
of the patient, here signifying both the corpus/corpse named as
"international law." They make a fervent plea for the development of a
"new doctrine concerning the use of force" based on law and economics
type approaches. John Yoo has recently suggested that we draw upon the
resources of "hegemonic stability theory" concerning the production of
international public goods.88 On this approach, as far as is intelligible,
international public goods are best "provided by a single great power or
small group of powers-the hegemon" in ways that both maximize utility
and "overcome the collective action problem presented by large numbers
of states in an anarchical international system."89 I may not here rehearse
this "sophisticated" argument. Nor may its full consequence consist, to
adapt a phrase of Antonio Cassese, in a new "Return to Westphalia." 90 Nor,
further, may I here (for reasons of space) revisit some recent alternate
revisitation of the human rights oriented theory of global public goods.91
87 David Luban assails the emergence of such a regime on three grounds: First, "it broadens the
category of permissible wars"; second, "it includes in the category situations where the burdens and
infirmities of judgment are unavoidable"; and third, it "makes rival states into legitimate targets of each
other's preventive wars." See Luban, supra note 66 at 288. All in all, thus, "the doctrine of [preventive
wars] is too permissive" (ibid.).
88 See John Yoo, "Using Force" (2004) 71 U. Chicago L. Rev. 729 at 792.
8 9 Ibid. However, as a general proposition this hegemonic "right" may not be universalizable; the
new nuclear states (India and Pakistan) and the threshold nuclear states (Israel, Iran, and North Korea)
may not invoke this "right." Further, Southern States may not recourse to preemptive force against
Northern states allegedly supporting "terrorism."
90 See Antonio Cassese, "Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of the
Charter System" in Antonio Cassese, ed., The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Martinus Niihoff, 1986) 505.
91 See e.g. Inge Kaul et aL, eds., Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
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However, any attempt at laying the "new" foundations for
international law pose grounds for grave anxiety when the militaristic
production of collective human security as an international public good is
presented as the only or the best alternative to meet the challenges of the
"war of terror." Any fundamental rethinking of the normativity of restraints
on the use of force in international relations, solely in terms of a new
hegemonic calculus, has little or no use for the old "shibboleths" such as the
doctrine of sovereign equality of states, international human rights and
humanitarian law, and the normative, human rights friendly, jurisprudence
of the UN Charter. These do not hold any real potential, on this view, for the
production of the international public good of collective human security.
B. Politics and "Law" of Regime Change
Regime change now threatens to become a term of art on a
consequentialist justification servicing the dangerous incoherence of the
newly-fangled doctrine of "preemptive" self-defence, or more simply and
starkly, the normatively uncanalized aggressive "preemptive" use of force.
The illegality, or ambiguous legality, of the Afghan and Iraq invasions thus
stands liable to be generalized beyond the now fiercely maintained
argumentation that the world is "a better place" without Saddam Hussein
or the Taliban. Closely examined, this, of course, constitutes an unalloyed
justification for "tyrannicide," with all its complex and contradictory
history," and yet outlawed by any, even the most "scriptural" and
"spiritual," grasp of the UN Charter and jurisprudence. In any event,
tyrannicide is not as of yet a human right, although so claimed in the
ancient and long history of its supporters. Ought this right, now expressed
in the languages of justified ouster of tyrants (including, where feasible,
their being killed), become "legitimate" as an instrument of liberal foreign
policy in the pursuit, somehow, of cosmopolitan values? The "new"
international law regime-change articulations, at the end of a terribly
devastating day, posit an unjustifiable norm, but because the best of
ameliorative world order considerations will never countenance
justifications for equally pertinent and vast regime changes in the coalitions
of willing states. Prescinding this pragmatic hegemonic argument, there
exist some intrinsic moral reasons militating against a universalization of
the doctrine of violently imposed regime change, which I may not
92 See Oscar Jdszi & John D. Lewis, Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide
(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957). I thank Peter Jaszi (Professor of Law, Washington College of Law)
for making available this now out-of-print, even rare, text. See also Franklin L. Ford, Political Murder:
From Tyrannicide to Terrorism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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adequately address here.
State hegemonic theory seeks, then, at the end of the day, or rather
its long neo-colonial night, to limit the doctrine of enforced regime change
only in respect to the subordinate/subaltern units of international order.
Only these remain vulnerable and liable to aggressively enforced regime
change. The hegemonic regime-changers acknowledge no dignity of
discourse, whether in terms of international law or morality, to the "evil"
regime-incumbents. Put another way, the violent regime-changers may not
be constrained in any way in their serial aggressive pursuits by any regard
for or consideration of their own past histories of presentation/
representation of these very regimes as producers of international public
goods. Further, the hegemon may itself observe no restraint whatsoever in
its sudden, swift, and steadfast deconstruction and reversal of regimes that
now, at will, are christened as "evil regimes" liable to unscrupulous and
aggressive overthrow. All that decisively matters then is the instant and
contemporaneous characterization by a global hegemon of a regime as
actually or potentially evil, this evil now being defined in terms of alleged
and inherently improvable complicity with "terrorists" (if only because the
latter constitutes a mobile horizon of actors, networks, and histories of
prior support and nourishment of these by their current prosecutors).
The consequentialist regime change discourse gloats over the
happenings of some "benign" transformations. Thus, Donald Rumsfeld
now celebrates in full international gaze, over CNN, his wide-eyed wonder
that the Afghan people have actually voted in "free and fair" elections (he
keeps on refraining that the poll results are "amazing!"). Likewise, the
triumphalist discourse of Prime Minister Tony Blair exults (in the House
of Commons Debates) the demise of Saddam Hussein, as providing
somehow the ultimate moral justification for the manifold horrors of the
Iraq war! This discourse seeks to altogether silence dissident voices, at
home and abroad, that protest the enormity of orders of civilian casualties,
the perfidies of lawless military/belligerent occupation, the endless shifting
prevarications concerning the "postconflict" transition of Iraq, and much
else besides (especially in terms of the rather singular non-division of spoils
resulting from this invasion that restricts the bounty/windfall to the
American corporate world).
The performative instantiation/actualization of the "new"
international law of regime change invites politically non-partisan critical
deliberative attention, if only because it portents new discursive styles
addressing the future of international law and a global ethic of international
relations amidst the wars of and on "terror." At stake, rather summarily
put, remain the conflicting deontological and consequentialist approaches
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to regime change that go beyond simple "moral recipes." 93 How may any
imagination of a "new" international law aspire to institute normative
restraints on the politics of regime change, which now threatens to burgeon
in further unfoldment of the war on terror? At least, we may ask, what new
orders of the Grotian temperamenta belli ought to inform the career and
future of these horrendous justifications pressed in the pursuit of regime
change? And what duties of assistance and reparation may be owed for
excessive and unrestrained use of force?
94
VII. JUS POST BELLUM
All this, then, reverts attention to the intimate and intricate relation
between jus ad bello and jus post bellum. What duties of postwar justice
arise, even under the tormented justificatory zodiac of
preventive/preemptive war on terror? How may we read, in the
contemporary circumstance, the law of belligerent/military occupation?
How far may any distinctly Kantian reading of it thus remains legible under
the current conjuncture? 95 At issue then are three difficult questions:
First, what obligations are there to restore the sovereignty of a conquered country and what
limitations do these obligations impose on states' efforts to remake the governments of
vanquished countries? Second, conversely, what are the rights and obligations that
belligerent states retain in the political reconstruction of a defeated power? Are these rights
limited to the reconstruction of genocidal regimes, or can a case be made for the political
remaking of less dangerous dictatorships? Third, what obligations might victorious states
have to restore the economy and infrastructure of a defeated state? And conversely, do
victorious states have a right to demand some kind of reparation payments from defeated
states who were aggressors in the concluded war?
96
See e.g. Brilmayer, "Realism Revisited," supra note 70.
94Richard W. Miller offers some "larger lessons" that arise from Afghanistan and Iraq. See
Richard W. Miller, "Terrorism, War, and Empire" in Sterba, supra note 10, 186. Any ethical justification
of the "war on terror" entails a fine regard for "proportionality" in the use of force. Further,
"responsibilities of trusteeship" provide the "rationale for a strong duty of aid" (ibid. at 201-02). The
responsibility has to be fully understood in terms of aggravating past conduct. Miller thus maintains that
this deepens the moral responsibility because, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States
"contributed to the deadly disorder by which it justifies its pursuit of suzerainty, by prior manipulation
of fates in countries in which it now seeks enhanced control. The United States played an active role
for decades in contributing to fanaticism in Muslim countries through support of fundamentalist groups
reliably and ferociously opposed to the secular left, including the group that became Al Qaeda" (ibid.
at 202).
95 See James Turner Thompson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1999); Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo,
Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2000). Gary J. Bass, "Jus Post Bellum: Postwar Justice and
Reconstruction" (2004) 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 384, resituates our reading of these texts in the present
difficult moment.
96 Bass, ibid. at 385.
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These weighty questions ought to engage the TWAIL community's
closest consideration given the complex and contradictory ethical and
ideological justifications for preventive/preemptive wars on terror. At the
very least, we all must engage with the maxim that erects "a presumption
against any right of the victors to reconstruct a defeated country"9 7 in terms
of politics, economy, and culture. This task remains the more important
because of the refractory effect ofjuspost bellum on the rationales ofjus ad
bello. Because space constraints forbid a detailed exploration here, all I may
say is that the prose of international law of war, and of belligerent
occupation, as this discourse was once upon a time named, now needs an
anxious TWAIL revisitation.98
VIII. IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION
Both the "wars"-the war of and the war on terror-prefigure a
"new" international law now in the making within the "circuits of nihilism."
Some new forms of political nostalgia for a regime of unrestrained and
unsanctioned use of force by states now stand presented. The horrible
violence against the "war of terror" is now represented as constituting an
abundant "jurisgenerative"repertoire of resources (to invoke Robert
Cover's inestimable phrase). 99 But the performatives of the "war on terror"
also violently remind us of what Cover also addressed as the "jurispathic,"
agianst which the "jurisgenerative" potential may be measured. Nostalgic
recourse reminds us of the jurispathetic violence of the Old Cold War,
which the New "Cold War" now repositions as justified imposition, yet all
over again, of whole new eras of endless reproduction of human suffering
and human rightlessness under the very banner and insignia of promoting
alternate futures for the emergent "new" postcolonial and post-globalizing
international law and human rights. Are these "creative" uses of nostalgia
that reinvent the past necessary? How are these justified? The further
question is whether they are sufficient unto the "evil of the day."
The epistemic TWAIL communities now stand summoned to the
tasks of speaking to different futures than those hitherto signified, and even
constituted, by the two terror "wars." Their tasks were poignantly and
presciently anticipated by Albert Einstein (whose birth cenenary we now
9 7 Ibid. at 396.
98 In particular, I invite readers to David Luban's argumentative strategy that insightfully suggests
that even as regards to "rogue" states, any morally defensible "general doctrine of preventive war"
restricts justification and may "justify" its launching only by "the target of the threat, not third parties."
See Luban, supra note 66 at 209 [emphasis added].
99 See Robert M. Cover, "Foreword: Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 40-44.
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celebrate this year) who said towards the end of his life (and I quote this
from memory, without any platitudinous benefit of a footnote sourcing)
that "politics is harder than physics." I may here add that politicsfor human
rights remains even harder than the politics of human rights now celebrated
and calibrated in superabundance of some rank and gross consequential
justifications offered by the perpetrators of the "war on terror.'1° How may
the TWAIL communities fashion, Grotious-like, the new politics of human
hope that reconstructs a new order of temeperamenta belli amidst the two
terror wars? One may only hope that these nascent communities may prove
robust enough to survive this dire confrontation.
100 See Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) for a further
elaboration of thse two forms of "politics."
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